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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 53 JUNE 1955 No. 8 
The Michigan Law Review presents in this issue six articles re-
viewing the most interesting and significant chapters of the Report 
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws (March 31, 1955). The editors of the Review hope 
that these critiques, prepared by teachers and practitioners in 
the antitrust field, will be a useful guide to the contents of the 
Report and will serve as a point of departure for further discussion 
of the committee's work. 
BASIC ANTITRUST CONCEPTS 
Kenneth S. Carlston* 
IT is the function of this paper to summarize and evaluate chapter I of the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws. It will first be necessary to note briefly the 
circumstances attendant upon the appointment of the committee, its 
delegated function, its conception of its task and its working methods. 
No helpful critique of its accomplishments can be made unless its 
purpose and mode of operation are taken as the starting point. While 
many tasks remain to be done in the study of the antitrust laws, the 
committee's work should be appraised only from the standpoint of the 
tasks which it set for itself. After such a recapitulation of the history 
of the committee, there will be set forth a series of black-letter state-
ments summarizing the conclusions reached by the committee in chap-
ter I, together with an explanatory or critical comment on each. 
When Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., indicated his in-
tention to create the committee, he expressed the view that its goal 
would be to provide "a thoughtful and comprehensive study of our 
antitrust laws." In the view of the President of the United States, the 
committee's function was to aid in "modernizing and strengthening our 
laws to preserve American free enterprise against monopoly and unfair 
competition." In the view of the committee itself, a principal task would 
be to examine the large body of antitrust doctrine as developed by the 
courts and other agencies of the federal government. Such an ex-
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed. 
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arnination would fall into three parts: (I) analysis, (2) evaluation 
and (3) conclusions and recornrnendations.1 
The committee comprised fifty-nine wor~ng rnernbers,2 of whom 
about four-fifths were lawyers and law professors and the remainder 
economists. The stated aim in their selection "was to gather men who 
reflect interacting views on issues of antitrust policy."3 The commit-
tee was divided into work groups corresponding generally to the topics 
taken up in the several chapters of the Report. The functioning of 
the work groups and the entire committee is a rather remarkable ex-
ample of the group process as an instrument for achieving consensus. 
Given individual members vitally interested in reaching the group 
goal, subjected to a process of study, education, interchange of views, 
and those psychological pressures implicit in the performance of the 
role of a participant in a group endeavor such as this, including the 
minimizing of attitudes of advocacy and the corning to the fore of at-
titudes of respect, adjustment, cooperation and desire to reach the 
group goal of consensus and a useful contribution, an unusual degree 
of unanimity of viewpoint was reached in the Report. 
Chapter I of the Report is concise, clear and reveals a rather con-
siderable number of legal propositions which have been developed 
over the years by judicial construction of the Sherman Act. This phase 
of the Report is largely codification of the law in the sense of restate-
ment rather than attempts markedly to influence the development of 
the law in new channels. While many of the sentences of the Report 
might well have been printed as black-letter formulations of rules of 
law, some may feel that the Report could have usefully gone farther 
in this direction. That is to say, at numerous points the reader has 
to formulate his own impression of the nature of the propositions being 
advanced by the committee by drawing from the contents of several 
paragraphs or pages. Perhaps consensus could not have been reached 
if the committee had tried to go farther toward pointing up its remarks 
and making more explicit the general propositions or rules which are 
implicit in its discussions. Nevertheless, such a procedure would have 
been helpful to the reader and for that reason, among others, will be 
followed in the present article. 
1 REPORT oP THE ATTORNEY GENllRAL's NATIONAL CoMMI'ITEB TO STUDY THE 
.ANnntusT LAws, March 31, 1955, pp. iv, 3 (hereinafter cited as REPORT, followed by the 
page number). Page numbers in the text refer to the Report. 
2 There were 61 named members but two did not participate in the deliberations. 
8 REPORT iv. 
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The Rule of Reason 
I. The policy of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is to elimi-
nate situations in which competition is unduly limited. (p. 11) 
2. The Rule of Reason in the application of the Sherman Act 
"permits the courts to decide whether conduct is signi-ficantly and un-
reasonably anticompetitive in character or effect." (p. 11) 
Comment. The committee regards the Standard Oil case,4 as re-
affirmed by the American T ohacco case,5 as laying the foundation for 
the judicial application of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The 
Report contains an extended discussion of these two decisions but, un-
fortunately, only a most abbreviated discussion of the Rule of Reason. 
The Report in subsequent pages discusses the application of the Rule 
of Reason in the several types of situations in which it has arisen. This 
is indeed the only context in which the Rule of Reason can be usefully 
discussed. Reason in the abstract is a whimsical augur of results; it 
furnishes -no workable guide upon which to predict judicial behavior or 
to decide specific fact situations. In the language of the early common 
law judge, it must be "right reason," that is to say, it must be the 
judicial process at work in its procedures of fact determination, fact 
analysis, fact classification, weighing of competing values and search 
for workable rules of conduct which will smoothly and efficiently fit 
into the functioning of society. Hence the Rule of Reason attains 
significance only as it is viewed in the context of specific fact problems 
or disputes. 
Yet the general dissent of Louis B. Schwartz, appearing at the end 
of the Report, is illustrative of the current confusion concerning the 
approach to the antitrust laws which the Rule of Reason is intended 
to identify as a shorthand expression. It has become the battleground 
of extremists. On the one hand, defendants' counsel Hy to it as a new 
refuge promising a more secure shelter than, say, the shrapnel-ridden 
Appalachian Coals case. 6 On the other hand, supporters of a rigid 
application of per se illegality doctrines would destroy it, regarding it 
as a citadel for the protection of powerful defendants and a barrier 
against the expansion of per se illegality.7 
When the Supreme Court moved from the common law context 
of control of agreements in restraint of trade,8 in a construction of the 
4 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911). 
11 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911). 
6 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933). 
7 E.g., general dissent of Louis B. Schwartz, REPORT 390-392. 
8Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). 
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Sherman Act as prohibiting all restraints of trade, 9 to a context in 
which it could examine and develop means of control for the complex 
market relationships and practices of an industrial civilization, as it did 
in the Standard Oil case,1° it took a step in judicial administration for 
which a modem parallel may be the Segregation Cases.11 Chief Justice 
Hughes called the Sherman Act "a charter of freedom" having "a gen-
erality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in 
constitutional provisions." The act "set up the essential standard of 
reasonableness."12 It was for the courts to determine the meaning of 
that standard in specific cases. Just as the Segregation Cases an-
nounced a policy decision later to be implemented by specific regula-
tions, so the Standard Oil case announced a general approach to the 
application of the Sherman Act which later decisions were to make 
explicit. These later decisions, in tum, under the rule of stare decisis, 
would become the repository of a continually developing body of law 
in which specific propositions or rules were constantly being tested as 
they were applied to new fact situations. Sometimes a prior decision 
was found to be applicable, sometimes not; sometimes the rule of the 
prior decision needed to be reformulated and a new distinction made. 
The immemorial problem of stare decisis was under the Sherman Act 
cast in new terms as a conflict between the Rule of Reason and illegality 
per se. 
The judicial process must always operate as a system of classifica-
tion, as a search for a general rule and a classification of the case at 
hand as in or out of the general rule. It must always establish a 
dichotomy. The dichotomy of reasonableness under the Standard 
Oil case in itself furnishes no guide for decision; it merely furnishes a 
method of approach. The workable dichotomy is the specific rule, 
whatever it may be, developed in the specific fact situation in which 
the Rule of Reason is ostensibly applied. Hence, the rule that price 
fixing agreements are illegal is a rule which has a high-predictability 
value but it is nevertheless a rule which must always be approached in 
the light of the specific fact situation before the court. When such an 
agreement is merely part of a larger situation in which it is an incidental 
means to achieve socially desirable ends, it may well yet be sustained13 
despite the strictures of the Socony-V acuum case.14 
9 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight' Assn., 166 U.S. 290 at 331-332, 17 S.Ct. 
540 (1897). 
10 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911). 
11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
12 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 at 359-360, 53 S.Ct. 471 
(1933). 
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It is believed preferable to employ the dichotomy of lawful-unlaw-
ful instead of that of reasonable-unreasonable, which is often used in 
the Report to indicate the probable relevant judicial behavior. The 
inquiry here is the usual one of determining the lawfulness of certain 
types of conduct in the light of precedent. Little purpose is served 
in casting such predictions in terms of reasonableness instead of 
specific rules of law. Although the next heading herein refers to ille-
gality per se, discussion thereunder will be of specific propositions 
advanced in the Report, and their application, all on the basis of the 
lawfulness of the conduct under consideration. 
Illegality per se; Section 1 of the Act 
3. Certain forms of conduct may be "'conclusively presumed to 
'he illegal, by reason of their nature or their necessary effect.' " (p.11) 
4. When arrangements are found to exist which control price, 
either directly or by controlling production, they are unreasonable per 
se and further inquiry under the Rule of Reason ceases. (p. 12) 
5. Whether such arrangements in fact exist may require an in-
quiry into their purposes as well as their effect. ( p. 14) Such an in-
quiry may reveal agreements (pp. 14-15), types of distributive 
methods (pp. 15-16), market support (pp. 16-17) and activities of 
trade associations (pp. 17-22) designed to affect prices in a desired 
manner. 
Comment. The careful analysis necessary to determine whether 
specific conduct is to be condemned as price fixing is set forth in the 
Report. Often the manner in which the market functions must be 
investigated in order to determine whether the conduct in question will 
have the prohibited effect. Resale price maintenance agreements are 
to be condemned as impairing competition even though they are con-
fined to the fixing of prices in the distribution of a single producer's 
goods15 instead of a horizontal price fixing agreement as in the Trenton 
Potteries case.16 
Conduct falling short of direct price fixing may nevertheless have 
that effect. Particular types of distributive methods may have no real 
business justification other than to achieve control over price determina-
tion by others by means which may be regarded as an abuse of other-
13 United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 621; Board of Trade 
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242 (1918). 
14 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940). 
t5Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 
(1911). 
16 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377 (1927). 
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wise legal privileges. Measures of control by a manufacturer which 
pervert his privilege to refuse to sell to others1 7 into an instrument of 
constraint having the effect of an agreement to maintain resale prices 
will be condemned.18 Conduct having no other purpose than that of 
affecting prices and in fact accomplishing that end will be illegal.19 
Trade associations of manufacturers are privileged to collect, analyze 
and distribute market information, such as sales, shipments and prices,20 
but when this privilege is exercised in such a manner as to inhibit free 
price competition among members and to conduce to the establishment 
of market prices other than those which unfettered competition would 
produce the conduct ceases to be privileged.21 A multiple basing point 
system will become unlawful when it is used as a means to eliminate 
competition as to price, quality or terms of sale and when adherence 
thereto by recalcitrants was enforced by collective sanctions such as 
reprisals or boycotts. 22 
6. Practices not directly fixing prices but nevertheless influencing 
the processes of price formation will be examined to determine, 
among other things, whether such practices have a primary or a merely 
incidental effect upon prices. (pp. 23-24) 
Comment. Conduct may not involve price fixing but may affect 
price formation. In such case, the lawfulness of the conduct in ques-
tion will depend upon the relative significance of the competition 
eliminated as a result of the conduct as compared with its other pur-
poses or effects. An analysis must be made of the total situation in 
which the measure of control of the processes of price formation is used 
in order to determine whether it is employed by the defendants to in-
hibit free competition in the market or is instead used to promote effec-
tive competition. 23 
7. When agreements among competitors for the division of 
markets are found to exist, they are unreasonable per se. (p. 26) 
Comment. The Report points out that agreements among actual 
or potential competitors not to compete in specified territories or for 
11 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465 (1919). 
1s F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150 (1922). 
19 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Corp., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 8II (1940). 
20 Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 45 S.Ct. 
578 (1925); Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 
S.Ct. 586 (1925). 
21 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 114 
(1921); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 629 (1936). 
22F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948). 
23 Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242 (1918); 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933). 
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specified customers obviously eliminate competition and hence are un-
lawful. Although the cases which have so far arisen of this nature 
have involved competitiors who as a group possessed substantial, and 
often dominant, market power, and hence necessarily would have a 
significant effect upon competition in the market, the Report states 
that a simple market division should be held unlawful.24 
8. Agreements providing for exclusive territorial dealership will 
be unlawful if they are part of an attempt to monopolize or an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade. An exclusive dealership which is merely an 
ancillary restraint reasonably necessary to serve or protect a main law-
ful business purpose of the parties and does not in fact unreasonably 
foreclose competition from the dealer's market should be upheld. 
(pp. 27-29) 
Comment. An agreement by a manufacturer with a distributor 
not to create another distributorship within a defined area would, as a 
matter of pure logic, be classified as an agreement in restraint of trade 
and hence unlawful. The distributor in such an agreement will 
usually agree to purchase only from the manufacturer but this question 
is only incidentally touched upon at this point, being reserved for 
chapter IV. The Report moves from the area of pure logic, however, 
to that of reality in its discussion of this problem. 
From the standpoint of organizational structure, an exclusive dealer 
can be regarded to be somewhat within the manufacturer's organiza-
tion. He is part of the manufacturer's established channels of distri-
bution. His purchases are usually institutionalized in a supply con-
tract of some duration. His sales behavior will to a certain extent re-
Hect established policies of the manufacturers. The business advan-
tages of the exclusive dealership will influence to a considerable ex-
tent de facto acceptance of the supplier's authority. The analogy 
which the Report finds to exist between the merger cases and exclusive 
dealerships is, accordingly, well-founded. 
The legality of exclusive territorial dealerships involves an inquiry 
into whether they are resorted to for their advantages as a distributive 
method and whether their effect is not unreasonably to foreclose com-
petition from the dealer's market. The Report reaches the conclusion 
that " 'to determine reasonableness under Section I' of exclusive dis-
tributorships, it seems relevant to focus, as the Court suggested in 
Columbia Steel25 and reiterated in Times-Picayune, 26 on [I] 'the per-
UREPORT 26. 
211 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 523-524, 68 S.Ct. 1107 
(1948). 
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centage of business controlled, [2] the strength of remaining competi-
tion, [and, 3] whether the action springs from business requirements 
li > "27 or purpose to monopo ze. 
Special Problems in Proof of Conspiracy 
9. An unlawful conspiracy to monopolize trade may exist solely 
between a corporation and its officers or between officers acting on its 
behalf, but not a conspiracy to restrain trade. (pp. 30-31) 
IO. A conspiracy to restrain trade between a parent and subsidiary 
corporations or between subsidiary corporations is not unlawful when 
the effect of the restraint is confined to the corporate family; it is un-
lawful when the concerted action restrains the trade of strangers to the 
corporate family. (pp. 31-34) When effective control of the voting 
stock of two or more corporations is held by a single individual or 
group of individuals, the relationship involved shall, for the purpose 
of the foregoing, be treated as equivalent to a parent-subsidiary relation. 
(p. 35) Some question exists whether the distinction noted in the first 
sentence above should be made and whether a single business enter-
prise whose legal structure takes the form of two or more corporations 
should be treated differently under the law from one whose legal struc-
ture is confined to a single corporation. (p. 35) 
Comment. The Report comes to grips with two of the most cur-
rently debated problems in the field of conspiracy under the Sherman 
Act, namely, that of intra-enterprise conspiracy and of "conscious paral-
lelism." The above propositions 9 and IQ set forth the committee's con:-
clusions on the first of these problems while proposition 11 below 
deals with the second problem. 
The discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy is most careful and 
thoughtful. The essential philosophy of this phase of the Report is 
that the doctrine needs to be clarified and its proper limits more precise-
ly defined. This the Report does. Apparently some members of the 
committee, with whom the writer is in accord, feel that the doctrine is 
purely of a formal rather than a substantive character. They would 
urge that when otherwise no liability under section I would exist for 
a company doing business through branches, divisions or departments, 
it is wholly unreal to impose liability merely by virtue of the fact that 
it employs subsidiaries instead.28 
26 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 615, 73 S.Ct. 
872 (1953), quoting and citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 
527, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948). 
27REPonT 28. 
28 REPORT 35. 
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Problems of corporate structure should arise under the Sherman 
Act only as subsidiaries become instrumentalities to forbidden ends.29 
The solution which the Report adopts for the purpose of stating the 
applicable law on this point may, in last analysis, coincide with the 
view just stated. The Report makes a distinction between restraints 
affected within and outside the corporate family. The statement is 
made that "concerted action between a parent and subsidiary or be-
tween subsidiaries which has for its purpose or effect coercion or un-
reasonable restraint on the trade of strangers to those acting in concert 
is prohibited by Section I. . . . Where such concerted action restrains 
no trade and is designed to restrain no trade other than that of the 
parent and its subsidiaries, Section I is not violated."30 
The Report accordingly accepts the doctrine of intra-enterprise 
conspiracy and would stop its further expansion by excluding from its 
application such manifestations of policy within a corporate family as 
the fixing of marketing territories or prices. This is certainly a step 
in the right direction, for the doctrine itself is an anomalous one which 
makes conduct unlawful when it is performed by a business enterprise 
organized as a group of fictional legal personalities under a single con-
trol and yet permits the very same conduct to be lawful when it is per-
formed by a business enterprise organized in a single corporation. It 
is stated in the Report that: "Some members feel . . . that in no in-
stance can a parent and its subsidiary be held guilty of an offense that 
must be committed by more than one person. Since there would 
concededly be no liability under Section I, if a company does business 
through unincorporated branches, divisions or departments, they be-
lieve it is wholly unreal to impose liability where it employs sub-
sidiaries instead. To distinguish between these types of operations, 
they feel, is to sacrifice substance for mere form."31 
The substitution of individual stockholderships of two or more 
corporations for ownership by a parent corporation is seen to make 
no change in the foregoing analysis. The Report states: "Where 
more than a majority of voting capital stock in two or more corporations 
is lawfully owned by the same individual with the remainder held by 
noncompetitors only for investment, the situation is clearly equivalent 
to a parent-subsidiary relation."32 
29 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911); 
United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, affd. 332 U.S. 
319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C. 
N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504. 
30 REPORT 34. 
31 REPORT 35. 
32 Ibid. 
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The issue of de facto control of subsidiaries by minority stock-
holders as against inactive majority ownership is not raised. In this 
connection, Professor Kindleberger has made certain observations with 
respect to the control of foreign subsidiaries which apply to the prob-
lem of corporate control generally. He states: "The question of con-
trol bristles with legal and practical difficulties. . . . Practically, the 
question is where decisions are made and orders come from. Here all 
sorts of possible shadings are found. A small but cohesive minority of 
foreigners may operate the corporation, despite a wide majority of na-
tional ownership."33 
The locus of corporate control is a question of fact. Majority 
ownership will usually be probative of that fact. But the exercise of 
control may be proved by other facts. The writer has stated else-
where: "The question of the locus of authority is more than a purely 
legal question; it is a question of human behavior, of the extent to 
which authority is asserted and accepted."34 The formally prescribed 
center of decision:..making is not necessarily the center at which au-
thority is in fact exercised. 
The unlikelihood of expecting compliance with a decree requiring 
wholly-owned affiliates to compete is strongly pointed out in the Report. 
The decree in the Timken case, "requiring competition among com-
panies now fully controlled by American Timken, sacrifices substance 
to form .... [S]ince stock ownership constituted the essence of the 
combination, the obvious remedy should have been dissolution .... "3is 
This comment has so far been directed to proposition IO above, 
since it strikes at the heart of the problem of intra-enterprise con-
spiracy, at least from the standpoint of the functioning of the business 
enterprise. Proposition 9 above deals with the special problem raised 
by the possibility, under the law, of a conspiracy solely between a cor-
poration and its officers or between its officers on its behalf. The rea-
soning of the Report on this problem seems highly conceptualistic and 
is strictly a legal analysis of the issue involved. 
The legal personality of the corporate organization is a legal fiction 
made necessary by the fact that the organization as a functioning social 
group exhibits the behavior of individuals carrying out their respective 
corporate roles under the authority of the directing personnel of the 
group. Whether the group is large or small it is a social fact and its 
action must be brought under the domain of law. For the most part, 
33 KINDLEBERGBR, lNTBRNATIONAL EcoNoMics 346 (1953). 
34 Carlston, "Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N.W. Umv. L. REv. 713 at 722 (1955). 
35 REPORT 36. 
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the fiction of legal personality works reasonably in according the group 
the necessary protection under the law and imposing upon it the 
obligations which all participants in the processes of society must re-
cognize under the law. The antitrust laws represent a body of law 
in the administration of which the courts have generally come to re-
cognize that they are dealing with a special type of group action, name-
ly, the organization or the institution, and have required that data be 
submitted to them for the purposes of decision-making which will show 
the extent of the organizational power of the defendant, the types of 
market relations established by it, and the impact of its behavior upon 
the market. Responsibility is imposed upon the corporate organiza-
tion by virtue of the fact that the organization, as a corporate body, is 
held accountable for its torts and its crimes. At the same time, the 
individual member or members of the corporate organization who com-
mitted the acts in question in the performance of their corporate roles 
do not escape personal responsibility for their legal consequences mere-
ly because they were so performed. The Report laid down the rule 
in this connection that when a corporation commits a substantive 
crime, its officers and directors who participated therein are guilty of 
criminal conspiracy.36 
Starting from the premise set forth in the last sentence, the Report 
by unassailable logic reaches the conclusion that since monopolization 
is a substantive offense under section 2 and since a corporation which 
monopolizes in violation of section 2 commits a substantive offense, 
its officers and directors responsible therefor "may be guilty of a 
conspiracy to monopolize under that section."37 The Report then 
makes the distinction above noted between (1) the offense of restraint 
of trade and (2) a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade, and points out that a mere restraint of trade is not a substantive 
offense under section 1. Confining its analysis strictly to the latter 
concept of restraint of trade and bearing in mind that restraint of trade 
by a corporation is not itself a substantive offense, the conclusion is 
reached that a conspiracy by a corporation's officers acting on its behalf 
to restrain trade will not be a conspiracy in violation of section 1. The 
cases are said to be in accord with this proposition. Two decisions 
which may be argued to be opposed38 are distinguished on the ground 
36 REPORT 30, citing Barron v. United States, (1st Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 799; Minin-
sohn v. United States, (3d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 477; Egan v. United States, (8th 
Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 320 U.S. 788, 64 S.Ct. 195 (1943). 
37 REPORT 30. 
38 Patterson v. United States, (6th Cir. 1915) 222 F. 599, cert. den. 238 U.S. 635, 
35 S.Ct. 939 (1915); White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., (8th Cir. 1942) 
129 F. (2d) 600. 
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that violations of section 2 were charged in both cases, "thus making 
unnecessary to the result the brief discussion of the applicability of 
Section 1 to these facts. Where there is no charge of violating Sec-
tion 2, coupled with the Section 1 charge, the only reported decisions 
on the question have found no conspiracy in restraint of trade in joint 
action solely between a corporation and its officers acting on its behalf."39 
Certain difficulties are encountered in the acceptance of this logic 
as a guide for judicial decision. In the :first place, there are no federal 
common law crimes; the only federal crimes are those which are con-
stitutionally enacted by Congress.40 Officers and directors of a cor-
poration can be guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime only when a 
federal statute so provides. In each of the cases cited in the Report 
for the proposition that officers and directors who participate in the 
commission of a crime by a corporation are guilty of conspiracy, there 
was a statute expressly making such a conspiracy an offense.41 The 
:first of the cited cases raises the issue of aiding and abetting as a statu-
tory offense and the remaining two raise the issue of whether the con-
duct amounted to a prohibited conspiracy. In all cases, including 
those arising under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the :first ques-
tion to be answered is whether the statute in question prohibits con-
spiracy. Section 1 expressly prohibits conspiracies in restraint of 
trade and section 2 expressly prohibits conspiracies to monopolize. The 
,circumstance that monopolizing is also a substantive offense under sec-
tion 2 is thought to be utterly irrelevant. We are not here concerned 
with the general offense of conspiracy under the federal statute.42 
The only question at issue is the interpretation of the term conspiracy 
as used in sections 1 and 2 and application of these sections to con-
certed action by a corporation and its officers. Inasmuch as the cor-
poration is a legal :fiction, whether legal responsibility will be imputed 
to it will depend upon the conduct of its officers. If they are person-
ally guilty of a conspiracy to defraud the United States and have used 
the corporation as an instrumentality to that end, they will be guilty 
of an illegal conspiracy under the conspiracy statute and their guilty 
intent may be imputed to their corporation as well.43 The writer is in 
agreement with the view of the Report that the cases arising under 
39 REPORT 31, citing Nelson Radio &: Supply Co. v. Motorola, (5th Cir. 1952) 200 
F. (2d) 911, cert. den. 345 U.S. 925, 73 S.Ct. 783 (1953); Marion County Co-op. Assn. 
v. Carnation Co., (D.C. Ark. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 58. 
40 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 31 (1812); United 
States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 at 687, 12 S.Ct. 764 (1892). 
41 Note 36 supra. 
42 18 u.s.c. (1952) §371. 
43 Mininsohn v. United States, (3d Cir. 1939) IOI F. (2d) 477. 
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section 2 were rightly decided in holding that there could be no con-
spiracy to monopolize solely between a corporation and its officers. He 
is also in agreement with its conclusion that a similar result should be 
reached in section I cases. In both cases, however, he would place 
this result on the ground of interpretation of the term conspiracy as 
used in the statute and he would not rule out the possibility in either 
section 1 or 2 that a group of corporate officers could engage in a 
prohibited conspiracy from the consequences of which the corporate 
entity would not shield them under the :fiction that they were acting 
as a single person. The question is solely one of statutory interpreta-
tion of the provisions prohibiting conspiracy in both sections I and 2 
in the light of the general law relating to conspiracy. What is clearly 
to be condemned is any tendency to use the fiction of the corporate 
legal personality as a means for subjecting to punishment conduct by 
corporate officers which would be otherwise legal. The evil is at best 
only inferentially raised in the Report. 
11. "Conscious parallelism," in the sense of uniform business 
behavior knowingly carried out, is evidence of, but not an equivalent 
of, conspiracy. Its probative value of conspiracy will vary case by 
case. (pp. 36-40) 
Comment. The Report indicates the elusiveness of the term "con-
scious parallelism." It points out that the word "conscious" may only 
import ''knowledge that a particular course of conduct has been fol-
lowed by competitors." The word "parallelism" may refer to "col-
lusion" or merely "uniformity of business behavior." Proof of uniform 
business behavior knowingly carried out by the members of a group of 
competitors is not, in the view of the committee, sufficient proof of an 
illegal combination or conspiracy though it may be introduced as 
evidence thereof for consideration with other proof. 
The problem from the legal standpoint is one of the weight to be 
accorded evidence of this nature in the light of the relevant precedents. 
The problem from the economics standpoint is that of determining 
whether managerial decisions in response to the stimuli of market con-
ditions are motivated by considerations of benefit to the individual en-
terprise or to a group of enterprises. If short-term desiderata are re-
garded to be the more important, then departures from uniform busi-
ness behavior may be more readily expected. If long-term considera-
tions are given precedence, then there may be a greater likelihood of 
adherence to the common behavior patterns of others. Moreover, the 
informed business judgment of managerial groups may very well tend 
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to coincide given a substantial .identity of the data upon which they 
are predicated. All this reinforces the conclusion that a judgment 
reached either by legal or economic reasoning will be difficult to ar-
rive at and to support persuasively. The Report correctly concludes 
that: " 'Conscious parallelism' is not a blanket equivalent of con-
spiracy. Its probative value in establishing the ultimate fact of con-
spiracy will vary case by case. Proof of agreement, express or implied, 
is still indispensable to the establishment of a conspiracy under the 
antitrust laws."44 
A number of the members of the committee concurred in a state-
ment by Professor Rostow dealing with the problem of uniform be-
havior by a small number of companies which together substantially 
occupy a market. It was said, "In appropriate cases, such evidence 
[of interdependent behavior] that economic power has in fact been 
combined in the pricing process may legitimately permit broader infer-
ences as to the knowledge of participants, and the degree to which 
their actions were consciously concerted."45 
As a final point, the Report notes that mere membership in a trade 
association, whose officers had conspired with some members to vio-
late the antitrust laws, should not result in a blanket finding of "guilt 
by membership."46 
12. "Monopolizing under section 2 consists of monopoly in the 
economic sense-that is, power to fix prices or to exclude competition 
-plus a carefully limited ingredient of purpose to use or preserve 
such power. Economic monopoly becomes illegal monopolization not 
only ( 1) if it was achieved or preserved by conduct violating section 
1 but also (2) if it was, even by restrictions not prohibited by section 
1, deliberately obtained or maintained. This element of 'deliberate-
ness' or 'purpose,' distinguishing economic monopoly from the offenses 
of monopolization, differs from the more demanding concept of 'spe-
cific intent' relevant where the offense alleged is an attem1t to monopo-
Jize." (p. 43) 
13. Monopoly exists when a single seller, or a group of sellers 
acting in concert, has the power to control market price or to exclude 
competition. (pp. 43-44) Unlawful monopoly exists when such power 
exists and is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise it. (pp. 43-
44, 55) 
44 REPORT 39. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 
U.S. 537 at 540-541, 74 S.Ct. 257 (1954), is cited in support of this conclusion. 
45 REPORT 42. 
46 Ibid. 
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Comment. The development of the law of monopoly under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act has been inB.uenced by a number of forces 
not necessarily apparent on the face of the decisions. 
1. The Sherman Act is essentially a regulatory statute cast in the 
form of a penal statute. Rules which might otherwise be desirable as 
a matter of economic policy toward preserving competition may never-
theless raise issues of policy under the criminal law which would cause 
the courts to shrink from applying them. 
2. In this atmosphere it has been difficult until recently for the 
courts to regard questions of market structure in the same manner as 
questions of market behavior. So long as mere market position was 
regarded in static instead of dynamic terms, which is the point of view 
implicit in the United States Steel case that "the law does not make 
mere size an offense,"47 it was impossible for the courts to leap the 
hurdle that the numerical or relative quantity of market transactions 
of a single firm could, without more, result in a criminal act. 
3. The language of section 2 itself operates to reinforce the point 
of view indicated in the preceding paragraph, since that which is 
prohibited is not monopoly but monopolizing. 
4. The criminal law setting of the Sherman Act has brought it 
about that problems of proof and evidence which would be difficult 
enough in a regulatory statute of such a wide scope are enormously 
multiplied when it becomes necessary to prove criminal intent and 
abuse of power. Hence the continual search of the courts for formulas 
of decisions and procedures of trial which would simplify and expedite 
the task of judicial administration. 
5. The courts have become growingly aware that the doctrine of 
conspiracy was not always a practical means for dealing with problems 
of dominant market power achieved by a small group of sellers con-
sciously coordinating, though not through agreement, their marketing 
policies so as to achieve the advantages of oligopoly or monopoly. 
The Report begins its study of the monopoly problem first by de-
fining monopoly as set forth in propositions 12 and 13 above and then 
by proceeding to analyze the constituent elements of the concept of 
monopoly as thus defined. These elements are (1) the determination 
of the relevant market, (2) the amount of market power needed to 
constitute monopoly, and (3) the existence of the necessary "purpose" 
47 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 at 451, 40 S.Ct. 293 
(1920). Accord, United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 at 708, 47 
S.Ct. 748 (1927). 
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or "deliberateness" required to make monopoly into the offense of mo-
nopolizing. The Report concludes this phase of its study with the 
special problem on the defense of monopoly upon the ground that it 
has been "thrust upon" the defendant. The Report thereafter pro-
ceeds to the problems of monopoly obtained by combination and of 
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. 
It should be realized that section 2 uses the verb "monopolize" to 
describe the prohibited conduct and does not in terms prohibit the 
mere status of monopoly or monopolization. Possibly the most impor-
tant judicial landmarks in the modem construction of the Sherman 
Act were the decisions which resulted in establishing as sufficient proof 
of monopolizing (I) the existence under the control of a single seller, 
or a group of sellers acting in concert, the power to control market 
prices or exclude competition, together with (2) the purpose to use 
or preserve such power. 48 The second element is largely a formal one. 
As Judge Hand himself states, the "distinction is ... purely formal; 
. . . it would disappear as soon as the monopoly began to operate; for, 
when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell at 
some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price which 
it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its exercise must needs coa-
lesce. "49 Upon this foundation the Report adopts the definition of 
monopoly power set forth in proposition 13 above. 
14. 'Whether monopoly power for purposes of section 2 exists 
requires -first a de-finition of the market within which it is to be meas-
ured . ... For these purposes, the market is normally identi-fied both 
in terms of the trade in products, -field or services affected by the con-
duct, and the geographical areas within which such trade may be 
limited." (pp. 44-45) "The appropriate market is the 'area of effective 
competition' within which the defendant or defendants operate." (p. 
44) 
Comment. It should be noted that proposition 13 above makes 
it necessary to establish not only the existence of the power to control 
market price or to exclude competition but the possession of that power 
in the hands of a single seller or a group of sellers acting in concert. 
The problem of identifying such a single seller will ordinarily raise 
no special difficulties but when shall a group of sellers be segregated 
48 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416. 
49 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 
428. 
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out or classified as possessing such power? This question was raised 
in the American Tobacco Co. case but the Report does not enter upon 
an examination of this question except in general terms under propo-
sition 20 below. The first question which the Report takes up in ex-
ploring the constituent elements of the term "monopolize," as con-
strued under the American Tobacco Co. and Alcoa cases, is that of the 
determination of the relevant market. 
The focal point of the Sherman Act is the preservation of compe-
tition. Section 2 is designed to ensure that no one supplier or group 
of suppliers shall be unduly shielded from competition. To employ 
a certain concept from the field of psychology by way of illustration, 
section 2 is designed to ensure that the space of free movement or the 
area of freedom in decision-making of each supplier is always subject 
to the pressure of rivals seeking to reach the same goal. The concept 
of the market tends, therefore, to be approached by the courts in the 
Sherman Act cases from the standpoint of the seller or sellers. The 
concept is, however, a relational one, for it involves a relation between 
sellers and buyers. Ideally there should be rivalry among buyers as 
well as rivalry among sellers so that each transaction involves an exer-
cise of choice by the parties on both sides of the equation. 
It will be observed that the Report approaches the definition of 
the market primarily from the standpoint of the classification of sellers 
and the determination of the competitive pressures to which they are 
in fact subjected and the effect of their decisions upon those of other 
sellers. The Report states: "Identification of markets required for solu-
tion of an antitrust problem is primarily one of fact. The starting point 
is to ascertain the actual competition to which the defendants are ex-
posed, and the effect on rivals of the conduct they have undertaken. 
For these purposes, the market is normally identified both in terms of 
the trade in products, field or services affected by the conduct, and the 
geographical areas within which such trade may be limited."110 The 
Report then quotes with approval the statement of the Supreme Court 
that the Sherman Act has geographical and distributive significance, 
and it applies "to any part of the United States as distinguished from 
the whole and to any part of the classes of things forming a part of 
interstate commerce."111 Yet this quotation merely sets the stage for 
investigation. What criteria shall govern the selection of the product 
or products whose market shall be the framework for determining the 
50 REPORT 44-45. 
51 REPORT 45, citing Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub-
lishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 at 279, 55 S.Ct. 182 (1934). 
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extent of competition among sellers? What criteria shall govern the 
determination of the geographical limits of a market? The answer to 
these two questions will be the subject matter of propositions 15 and 
16 below. 
15. The determination of the relevant market will include the 
market for substitute commodities if these are procurable by more than 
a limited number of buyers within reasonable variations in prices. (pp. 
46-47) 
Comment. The Report recognizes that the concept of the market 
also raises a problem in the classification of buyers as well as sellers, 
and that the competitive pressures to which a seller is subject cannot 
be fully determined until the extent or area of choice of his buyers is 
also investigated. The Report points out that before the element of 
choice open to buyers of a product in shifting their purchases to a sub-
stitute product can be considered, the substitute "must be actually com-
petitive." But what is "competitive?" Here consensus was lacking 
among the members of the committee. 
The Report states: "Most members would simply emphasize, how-
ever, that more than a limited number of buyers should be able within 
reasonable variations in prices to buy either the product or the substi-
tute, for both commodities to be considered in the same market for 
Sh A t "52 erman c purposes .... 
The Report notes that in the Columbia Steel case53 "the relevant 
market was differently defined for each product affected .... "54 The 
problem raised by the United Shoe Machinery case55 in this connection 
is not discussed. Under one tabulation in that case, the percentage of 
use by shoe manufacturers of defendant's machines ranged from 48 
percent to 100 percent, depending on the kind of machine involved. 
Under another tabulation, the percentage ranged from 41 percent to 
I 00 percent. In general, the machines performed different functions 
and hence were not substitutes for one another. Yet for purposes of 
52 lli!PoRT 47, quoting with approval from Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594 at 612, n. 31, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953): "For every product, substitutes 
exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The 
circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product' to which, within reasonable 
variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products 
whose 'cross-elasticities of demand' are small." For a criticism of this quotation, see RE.PORT 
47, n. 168. · 
63 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948). 
64 REPORT 45. 
65 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 
295, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954). 
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decision the court arrived at an average which it found to be under 
United's control of "75 plus percentage of the shoe machinery market 
which United serves."56 The market chosen for purposes of decision 
was thus a class of buyers functionally defined or an industry rather 
than a class of buyers defined in relation to a product for which there 
was no ready substitute. The writer has elsewhere commented on the 
result in this case that it is comparable to a finding that a defendant 
who had control of 40 percent of the sales of com and 100 percent of 
the sales of wheat in a commodity market in which both were sold 
would have control of such commodity market to the extent of 70 per-
cent, the average of the two.57 
A number of cases dealing with limited geographical markets are 
noted in the Report but the criteria upon which the geographical con-
figuration of a market may become critical for Sherman Act purposes 
are not elaborated.58 The relevant criteria would seem to include such 
questions as whether the defendant's conduct had injuriously affected 
other sellers whose markets were in fact geographically limited, whether 
transportation costs were critical in preventing invasion of local mar-
kets, or whether defendant's conduct itself had as its primary purpose 
the object of creating a barrier against penetration of a local market by 
competitors. 
16. Section 2 of the act applies to offenses affecting "any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions." An unlawful monopolization, therefore, involves control over 
an identifiable market which constitutes an appreciable part of com-
merce. Whether a vertical integration is illegal under section 2 de-
pends upon the extent to which market competition is restrained; it 
does not depend upon the volume of business done by the company 
which is integrated independently of its relation to the market. (pp. 
47-48) 
Comment. The Report briefly touches upon a question of statu-
tory construction raised by section 2. It is whether the fact that section 
2 applies to offenses affecting "any part of the trade or commerce among 
56 110 F. Supp. 295 at 343. 
57 Carlston, "Tests and Evidence of Monopoly under the Sherman Act: a Restate-
ment," University of Michigan, Summer Institute, F.BDERAL .ANn-rnoST LAws 1953, 16 
at 26 (1954). 
58 REPORT 45, 48, discussing Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie 
Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182 (1934); United States v. Columbia 
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., (6th Cir. 
1898) 85 F. 271. 
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the several States, or with foreign nations" means that the words "any 
part" exclude the concept of the market and permit section 2 to apply 
merely to an amount of business sufficient in volume to overcome the 
objection of de minimus. The Report rejects this suggestion and adopts 
the position that the concept of the market "is integral to the basic 
concept of 'monopolization,' and the ideas of competition and monopoly 
on which it rests. Thus, section 2 of the Sherman Act deals with 
monopolizations affecting markets which constitute 'any part' of the 
trade or commerce covered by the Act."119 
The distinction of an "appreciable part of interstate commerce" 
advanced in the Yellow Cab case60 is discussed in the light of the 
Columbia Steel case, 61 with the comment that "this concept of the 
market cannot be invoked whenever competition is excluded for a sub-
stantial volume of business, as in ordinary cases of vertical integration. 
Their legality does not turn on the intentional monopolization of the 
business of the company integrated. This would make all vertical 
integration illegal under section 2. Instead, the legality of integration 
rests on the extent to which analysis reveals that market competition 
is restrained."62 
The essentiality of the concept of the market to section 2 cases is 
pointed out with the remark that: "Without a finding as to the market 
involved, there is no way of determining whether or not the defendants 
have a given degree of market power."63 
17. "To determine whether monopoly power exists, courts scruti-
nize market structure and behavior bearing on control over price and 
competitive opportunity." (p. 49) Monopoly power "need not neces-
sarily be associated with any given or fixed degree of market occupancy 
but may in some circumstances stem from some other strategic position 
in the market" creating a power to control the competitive opportunity 
of rivals. The "defendants' power over the interrelated elements of 
supply, price and entry" in the market must be considered and 
weighed. (p. 54) 
Comment. The Report incisively goes to the heart of the question 
of the extent of market power needed to constitute monopoly by laying 
it down that it is a question of "the extent to which competition from 
other market suppliers effectively limits the discretion of defend-
69 REPORT 47. 
60 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 at 225, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947). 
61 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948). 
62 Rl;poRT 48. 
63 Jbid. 
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ants .... " This discretion involves the "degree of power over market 
price, or over competitors' entry .... "64 The determination of whether 
such power exists in a prohibited degree is a product of a wide-scale 
inquiry into (1) the percentage of supply controlled, though the "rela-
tive effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting 
in which that factor is placed/'65 (2) "market structure;' including "the 
relative size and the strength of competitors (e.g., that the share of 
market occupied by defendant or defendants has been increasing or 
decreasing); freedom of entry (including reference to such factors as 
capital requirements, locational advantages, and the importance of ad-
vertising); 'consumer demands,'" and (3) "market ... behavior bear-
ing on control over price and competitive opportunity," including "the 
way prices are actually formed and decisions made" and "the course or 
prices, their flexibility and relation to price trends in other industries; 
price competition among :6.rms; the presence or absence of trade cus-
toms tending to reduce price competition."66 The Report concludes: 
"Measuring monopoly power depends upon a full evaluation of the 
market and its functioning, to determine whether on balance the de-
fendants' power over the interrelated elements of supply, price and 
entry are sufficiently great to be classed as monopoly power. While the 
decisions illuminate the economic theory of the courts in evaluating 
these facts, they provide no magic formula for simplifying the in-
quiry. "67 A rather extended discussion of the relevant cases provides a 
background against which the foregoing analysis may be viewed and 
weighed.68 
18. Unlawful monopoly exists when the prohibited degree of 
monopoly power exists under a single control and is coupled. with the 
purpose or intent to exercise it. (p. 55) 
Comment. "Purpose or intent," as used in proposition 18 as well 
as proposition 13, is to be "sharply differentiated from the proof of 
'speci:6.c' intent to monopolize required where the charge is an unreal-
64 Ibid. 
65 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 528, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948). 
66 REPORT 49-50. 
67 REPORT 54. 
68 United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293 (1920); 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; United States v. Pullman 
Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
(D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295, affd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 
(1954). Certain doctrinal differences appear in the discussion of the United States Steel 
case, REPORT 51-52. 
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ized attempt to monopolize. . . . The history and business policy of a 
monopoly have a distinct bearing on the proof of 'deliberateness,' as 
distinguished from 'specific intent' .... Often the courts will infer that 
a monopoly position has been 'deliberately' maintained in this sense as 
a matter of 'objective' rather than 'subjective' intent, relying on business 
practice to support the conclusion that men intend the natural conse-
quences of their acts."69 
Question may be raised whether the element of deliberateness, as 
a requirement for the offense of monopolizing when the proof has 
established the requisite degree of market power, is merely a formal· 
requirement. If, as the Report itself notes, "no showing of intent is 
required beyond 'the mere intent to do the act' "70 (i.e., "where the 
defendant or defendants have actual monopoly power"), it would 
appear that, as Judge Hand states, the "distinction is ... purely formal" 
inasmuch as "the power and its exercise must needs coalesce."71 
19. Monopoly achieved by conduct lawful in itself may become 
illegal monopoly if such conduct were shaped by purposes to discour-
age, exclude or prevent the rise of competitors. (pp. 56-60) 
Comment. Wh~n a new rule is laid down by a court, its architect 
must consider its implications and possible applications and seek to 
frame its terms so as to regulate in the desired manner all its foreseeable 
consequences. In the Alcoa case Judge Hand envisaged the possibility 
that a strictly logical application of the doctrine there laid down for the 
first time might be applied to punish a defendant possessing the pro-
hibited degree of market power but otherwise guiltless of any wrongful 
conduct. Among the possibilities of such a situation arising, he foresaw 
that market demand might be so small that only a single large plant 
could economically supply it, that changes in market demand might 
drive out all but one producer, or that one company out of a number 
might survive because of its superior skill, foresight and industry. 
These types of excusable monopoly may be categorized as cases where 
a defendant has had monopoly "thrust upon it."72 In exploring the 
issue whether Alcoa was under this theory excused from a violation of 
section 2, Judge Hand made certain remarks which have engendered 
much debate and confusion. He concluded that Alcoa's conduct did 
69 REPORT 55-56. 
70 REPORT 56, citing and quoting from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
(2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 432. 
11 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 
428. 
12 Id. at 429. 
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not bring it under the suggested exception, that it was not "the passive 
beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimination 
of competitors by automatically operative economic forces. . . . It was 
not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand 
for ingot and be prepared to supply them. . . . It insists that it never 
excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion 
than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and 
to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great 
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections 
and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as 
limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by 
a desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pur-
sued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' "73 (Italics are supplied in the 
above quotation in order to indicate the source of certain reasoning in 
the United Shoe Machinery case discussed below.) 
The phrase "we can think of no more effective exclusion than 
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened" may or 
may not indicate conduct which should fall outside the indicated ex-
ception. Judge Hand felt that it should, presumably for the reason 
that, even though it was conduct which was otherwise -lawful and 
might in another setting even be laudable, in the case before him it 
was not conduct responsive to competitive pressures but designed to 
prevent such pressures from arising. It was not conduct part of a law-
ful main purpose but conduct primarily selected to accomplish an un-
lawful purpose. 
The United Shoe Machinery case must be read against this back-
ground. United was found to possess the prohibited degree of monop-
oly power in the market which it served. This fact and "other factors" 
were held to result in a violation of section 2. Such "other factors" 
were the circumstances that United had pursued business "practices 
not economically inevitable" or not "honestly industrial."74 
A concept thus negatively expressed may be difficult for less so-
phisticated courts to administer and may in future cases lead to some 
subjective or individualistic applications. Nevertheless, the concept is 
consistent with the fundamental basis of the Rule of Reason that con-
duct must always be viewed as a part of the total situation in which 
decisions resulting in such conduct are made and that, as the horizon 
of such situations enlarges, conduct which may be lawful becomes un• 
1s Id. at 430-431. , 
14 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 
295 at 344, 345, affd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954). 
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lawful as a means to a forbidden end, or conduct which may be by 
itself unlawful may become lawful when it is carried out in an inci-
dental manner to accomplish a lawful end and when its consequences 
are not, therefore, those which the rule of illegality in question was 
designed to prevent. The writer has elsewhere suggested that these 
developments under the Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery cases may 
in reality reflect the emergence of a special rule of law for the business 
£.rm possessing or sharing substantial market power. To such a £.rm, 
competitive behavior privileged as to the small £.rm may be denied. It 
must, in short, confine its market practices to those of pure price com-
petition-however elusive may be the content of that concept in its 
judicial application. 
20. When "monopoly power has been achieved through combi-
nation or conspiracy, Section 2 has been violated without more. 'Intent 
and purpose to exercise that power' is proved by the fact of combina-
tion or conspiracy." (p. 61) 
Comment. The condemnation of a monopoly in. the hands of a 
single seller is a condemnation of a condition or result which the law 
considers to be harmful to the economy. Yet, as we have noted above, 
section 2 will not permit such a condemnation to be made without at 
least satisfying the formal requirement of "deliberateness" discussed 
under propositions 12, 13 and 18 above. When, however, monopoly 
is achieved by combination, the law is concerned with the means as 
well as the end. In such a case, the fact that monopoly power was 
achieved in such a manner itself creates the necessary inference of 
"intent and purpose to exercise that power."75 
21. In order to establish the illegality of (1) an attempt to monop-
olize or (2) a combination or conspiracy to monopolize when monopoly 
power was not achieved, proof is required of a specific or subjective 
intent to accomplish an unlawful result. (p. 61) 
Comment. When monopoly power is sought through attempt or 
conspiracy but is not in fact achieved, section 2 requires proof of a 
specific or subjective intent to accomplish an unlawful result. The act 
is penal in nature and when it is applied to conduct which does not 
involve the commission of the prohibited offense of monopolizing itself 
but, instead, attempts or conspiracies to monopolize, proof of deliberate 
75 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 at 809, 66 S.Ct. 1125 
(1946). 
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purpose to accomplish the prohibited result is necessary.76 The Report 
states: "When the acts are done by a single firm, proof of intent may 
be established in the normal way-by contemporaneous documents, 
industrial background, and the like--with no single factor control-
ling."77 In the merger cases, a specific intent to monopolize is not 
shown when the only motivating circumstances shown are a deliberate 
intent to control the acquired company's policies. Evidence would be 
required that the acquisition "was part of a larger plan for gaining 
monopoly power by a series of mergers before the acquisition could have 
been condemned as part of an unlawful attempt under Section 2."78 
Meaning of "Trade or Commerce Among the Several States" 
22. The term "trade or commerce" as used in sections I and 2 of 
the act "is not limited to economic activities involving the production 
and physical movement of goods. Thus banking, insurance, finance, 
the business of conducting hospitals and making organized provision 
for medical care all may come within its scope." (pp. 62-63) A restraint 
of trade taking place within a state but nevertheless having an inter-
state effect may fall under the act. (p. 64) 
. Comment. The Report appears to adopt the philosophy, in apprais-
ing the scope of the term "trade or commerce among the several States," 
as used in the Sherman Act, that "commerce is a term of the largest 
import"79 and that "any agreement or combination which ... regulates 
interstate commerce to that extent and to the same extent trenches 
upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute."80 
The Report states that the term "trade or commerce" includes "all sorts 
of economic activities, so long as the requisite interstate effect is found." 
It "is not limited to . . . the production and physical movement of 
goods," but extends to such diverse activities as ''banking, insurance, 
finance, the business of conducting hospitals and making organized 
provision for medical care. . . ."81 It even extends to local restraints 
formally of an intrastate character which in fact have an interstate 
effect.82 
76 Swttt & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311 (1928), is cited in the 
Report at p. 61 as authority for this proposition but it appears to relate to consent decrees 
under the Sherman Act. 
77 REPORT 61-62. 
78 REPORT 62, citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 
1107 (1948). 
79 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 at 280 (1875). 
80 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, l 75 U.S. 211 at 242, 20 S.Ct. 96 
(1899). 
81 REPORT 62-63. 
82 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68 
1058 MmmcAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
Conclusions 
The studies presented in this issue of the Review, as well as an 
examination of the contents of the Report itself, reveal an extraordinary 
accomplishment of the judicial process at work in the development by 
the courts of the body of antitrust doctrine. Ever sensitive to the values 
of our democratic, free enterprise society, carefully exploring the func-
tioning of our enormously complex, industrial economy, feeling their 
way step by step under a statute which was primarily declaratory of a 
policy rather than enunciative of a set of regulations, the courts have 
in six and a half decades produced a body of law of very considerable 
magnitude. The administration of the Sherman Act and its supple-
mentary legislation known generally as our antitrust laws could have 
played havoc in our economy had it been in less able and responsible 
hands. It is true that there have been errors as well as successes in this 
total process of trial and error. The Report reveals consensus on a 
number of asserted errors and for its forthrightness- ·the members of the 
committee will doubtless be attacked and on a level otherwise than 
that of scientific debate. 
The functioning of the committee is believed to be a notable exam-
ple of group research and inquiry making its contribution to the ad-
ministration of justice. A substantial number of experts of varying 
viewpoints and typ~ of training and experience were drawn together 
in a group which set for itself the goal of making a dispassionate study 
of the administration of our antitrust laws and workable and acceptable 
recommendations for their improvement. To the reaching of this goal 
the members of the committee became more and more committed as 
its work went on. A common consciousness of the ~eaning of the role 
of committee membership emerged. The product of the committee's 
work reveals that in the performance of this role attitudes of the advo-
cate as shaped by his current professional responsibilities were sup-
planted by a desire to make the work of the committee a real contribu-
tion to the betterment of the functioning of our competitive system. 
It is the writer's prediction that even if the committee's recommen-
dations should not eventuate in legislation, the clarity and exactness of 
its analysis and the intrinsic persuasiveness and authority of its state-
ments will have a continuing and substantial effect in the adjustment 
of antitrust controversy both in and out of our courts. 
S.Ct. 996 (1948); United States v. Employing Lathers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 198, 
74 S.Ct. 455 (1954). 
